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Abstract
Our Critical Infrastructure (CI) systems are, by definition, critical to the safe
and proper functioning of society. Nearly all of these systems utilize indus-
trial Process Control Systems (PCS) to provide clean water, reliable electric-
ity, critical manufacturing, and many other services within our communities –
yet most of these PCS incorporate very little cyber-security countermeasures.
Cyber-attacks on CI are becoming an attractive target. While many vendor
solutions are starting to be deployed at CI sites, these solutions are largely
based on network monitoring for intrusion detection. As such, they are not
process-aware, nor do they account for interdependencies among other CI sites
in their community. What is proposed is an architecture for coordinating all CI
within a community, which defines characteristics to enhance its integration, its
resilience to failure and attack, and its ultimate acceptance by CI operators.
1 Introduction
Our critical infrastructure systems provide the supporting services necessary for safe and
productive living within our society. They are our electrical power, treated water, natural
gas utilities as well as roads, dams, hospitals, and telecommunications. The White House
and Department of Homeland Security have defined critical infrastructure and established
the priority through ongoing presidential directives and policy through at least the last three
presidents [1, 2, 3]. As such infrastructure is critical to the safe functioning of communities
and society, ensuring the secure and reliable operation of critical infrastructure becomes a
paramount concern and goal.
1.1 Problem Description
A large majority of our critical infrastructure depends on Process Control Systems (PCS) to
accomplish their mission, such as operating dams, performing water treatment, generating
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
06
99
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 J
ul 
20
16
electrical power, controlling critical manufacturing, etc. Included within PCS are Super-
visory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC),
and Distributed Control Systems (DCS). These systems have generally been late to imple-
ment significant cyber security countermeasures, and have thus recently been the subject of
attacks [4, 5]. In the past, PCS were built with custom systems and air-gapped from the In-
ternet, serving only the sensors and actuators of their respective processes. Starting around
the turn of the 21st century, the trends to replace these systems with Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) industrial hardware and mainstream operating systems, the interconnection
with corporate WANs, and other modernization techniques has created a new and signif-
icant attack surface [6, 7], which is expanding daily as new vulnerabilities are discovered
and new attacks developed.
Since these processes are so critical to the continued functioning of society, they present
a very attractive target to malicious cyber attacks, whether the attackers are nation-state
terrorists, or simply opportunistic crackers. It is inevitable that such cyber attacks on our
critical infrastructure will rise significantly in the near term and that the current lack of
preparedness will result in significant disruption to our society [8]. Further exasperating
this security problem is the fact that most critical infrastructure processes themselves rely
on other critical infrastructure processes, e.g., water delivery relies on electrical power.
Understanding and controlling this interdependence is a large problem in itself [9, 10], which
greatly complicates the building of coordinated solutions and sets the stage for significant
cascading failures.
1.2 Needed Approach
What is needed is a community-scale system to provide anomaly/intrusion detection, miti-
gation planning, and a coordinated response. This will ensure secure critical infrastructure
resilience through situation awareness and facilitate mitigating responses that build on the
infrastructure interdependencies as an asset, versus the chaos of handling multiple infras-
tructure as a complexity. To meet this need, architecture is proposed to integrate multiple
critical infrastructure PCS to provide a coordinating link for centralized management.
2 Previous Work
There have been several efforts related to the securing of individual critical infrastructure
with a cyber system. Most of these in practice employ the approach of adding COTS
security solutions from the field of Information Technology (IT), e.g., firewalls. While these
represent a best practices approach to basic computer network security, they are far too
ineffective as a primary security layer for critical infrastructure. One reason is that current
IT approaches do not take into account the unique software, hardware, and protocols used
in PCS, though some vendors have released products to address this, e.g., Tofino R©[11].
Another reason is that once an intrusion is detected, the PCS network must remain open
to continue the critical infrastructure process, as a shutdown would be too disruptive to
society. Therefore, mitigation and adaptation approaches are best and the focus of this
survey will be on such intelligent approaches.
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2.1 Individual Critical Infrastructure
Research efforts have been devoted to the development of intrusion detection techniques that
work on the network layer of PCS [12, 13]. Such research has resulted in software models
specific to PCS protocols and traffic patterns. This type of work extends the traditional IT
approaches to the PCS domain, but still lacks in mitigating approaches after attack, and
does not engage the physical critical infrastructure process itself; although Cheung et al.
[12] discuss using the network model as a detector for anomalous traffic. Other approaches
that consider the process under control [14, 15] have additional capabilities in that they can
detect when the infrastructure process is behaving abnormally. These capture attacks even
in scenarios of normal network traffic and proper authentication; some solutions also include
scenarios of operator error and equipment malfunction. Many other efforts exist and fall
into one or both of these categories of solutions that focus on system configurations specific
to PCS, and those that focus on the validity of the process being controlled, e.g., SOCCA
[16] provides situational awareness and contingency analysis for the power grid utilizing grid
state estimation techniques to provide security. These show the best merit moving forward,
but do not include coordination with other critical infrastructure to achieve community-
scale situational awareness and event management. For these, we need a community-scale
approach, and architecture of how to connect these.
2.2 Coordination of Multiple Critical Infrastructure in a Community
Again, the focus is on intelligent approaches that develop mitigating and adapting responses
to malicious or anomalous activities, now applied simultaneously among multiple critical
infrastructure taking advantage of interdependencies. In this scenario, a bigger net is cast
on the detection of cyber attacks within communities by monitoring multiple PCS, better
situational awareness is achieved, and calculated responses can consider the effects across
the domain of the whole community.
Branscomb et al. [17] identify communities (cities) as a mass infrastructure critical to sus-
taining society and make the case for the need of cooperation among infrastructure providers
for catastrophic risk reduction, noting vulnerabilities and potential cascading failures from
interdependency. Auerswald et al. [18] further supports this need with respect to the
problem of balancing the efficiency of critical infrastructure, which is typically owned and
operated by the private sector, with mitigating those critical infrastructure vulnerabilities
that greatly impact the community at large (public). Both of these [17, 18] introduce pol-
icy approaches that can lay the foundation for building a cooperative solution, but do not
explicitly define any system architecture for such a solution.
Other efforts have proposed methods to harness existing efforts and build partnerships for
community critical infrastructure protection between public and private entities [19]. Un-
derstanding the complexities of disaster management [20], and developing disaster-resilient
communities [21] have also been explored. The proposed architecture needs to address these
policy and partnership aspects while providing a foundation for common connectedness
among critical infrastructure systems. This facilitates the acceptance of community-based
solutions so they can be attempted and evaluated.
Murray and Grubesic [22] recognize the vulnerability conundrum in that reducing the worst-
case vulnerabilities does not necessarily ensure the best allocation of protective resources.
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This demonstrates the need for intelligent coordination in a solution. A particular critical
infrastructure in a community may mitigate their worst-case attack while leaving other
critical infrastructure more vulnerable or adversely affected by such protective actions, e.g.,
the rerouting of power during power infrastructure cyber-attacks impacting the delivery
of community drinking water. Additionally, the benefits of multiple critical infrastructure
working together are not enjoyed in individual solutions. Murray and Grubesic [22] further
expand this to discuss multi-community protective planning for protection from attacks.
Yusta et al. [23] provides an extensive review and categorization of the state-of-the-art,
c. 2011, in critical infrastructure protection software, which includes numerous and spe-
cific cyber-security approaches. These approaches focus on vulnerability, risk, and interde-
pendency identification and assessment to realize risk management systems by employing
modeling and simulation. In all of these, the goal is to understand the problem of critical
infrastructure cyber-security in the best detail possible, but the architecture for mitigation
and the advancement to a coordinating solution is still not realized.
3 The Proposed Architecture
The goal of this proposed architecture is to enhance PCS utilized in critical infrastructure
to realize a Community-scale Critical Infrastructure Coordination (CCIC). This will be
employed in communities for the security and resiliency of critical infrastructure and thus,
the normal functioning of society.
3.1 Definition of Key Characteristics
First, it is important to define a few characteristics that are key to a successful architecture
for the CCIC enhancement.
1. It must be relatively simple in order to be integrated within a wide range of PCS vendors,
configurations, and vintages of legacy systems.
a. This integration must also be simple for operators to use effectively, minimizing train-
ing and maximizing acceptance.
b. Key to maximizing acceptance is the ability to guarantee that the critical infrastruc-
ture process not be halted or negatively impacted by the CCIC, even if the CCIC is
maliciously compromised or experiences a failure mode.
2. It must incorporate learning to fit to the unique operating states of a specific critical
infrastructure process to minimize the impact of intensive installation effort and cost at
every site, which would significantly delay deployment of the CCIC.
a. Learning must be automated and data driven to capture the unique aspects of the
process, but must avoid being too opaque, i.e., black box, which would further hinder
diagnosis, monitoring, and acceptance by operators.
b. This learning must also adapt to changing process conditions as the actual equipment
ages, wears, or otherwise drifts out of calibration.
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3. It must be hierarchical in order to form links with peer critical infrastructure and uplinks
to higher-layer management.
a. These links should be bi-directional to provide both situation awareness and mitigat-
ing responses.
b. The CCIC should maintain some functionality at a local layer during the loss of any
or all of these links.
3.2 Defining the Local Hierarchical Layer
Secondly, the hierarchical layers need to be defined. At the first and local layer, i.e., at a
single critical infrastructure site, the architecture is integrated within the existing PCS as
illustrated in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, the architecture satisfies characteristic 1 by being positioned
Figure 1: Integrating at the local site, hierarchical layer 1.
outside the existing Critical Infrastructure (CI) process. Most modern PCS provide some
interface for reading process variables and can specify a read-only link, preferably through
hardware definition. The read-only link to the PCS ensures that under no circumstances can
the CCIC, either layer 1 or 2, write back (send) control commands to the PCS, intentional
or otherwise, satisfying characteristic 1b. These process variables are then monitored at the
local layer with respect to a learned model to classify operating states and detect anomalous
behavior. Variables that exhibit this behavior are sent to a rule-based expert system, which
provides reports and recommendations to the operator via the Human Machine Interface
(HMI). The variables may be simply reported, or the detection of anomalous behavior of
certain variables may direct the operator to take recommended actions. The final decisions
still go through a human, using the already familiar and existing HMI that is experienced
in the proper operation of the critical infrastructure, thus satisfying characteristic 1a. A
block diagram of this activity is described in Fig. 2. The architecture needed to perform the
activities of Fig. 2 requires a classification engine and an expert system, and is illustrated
in Fig. 3. Together, these achieve the characteristics in 2 including 2a and 2b. Artificial
Neural Networks (ANN) provide an excellent option for automated learning of patterns from
data, and modern computing systems can easily execute these in near real time for a critical
5
Figure 2: Activities within hierarchical layer 1.
infrastructure process. However, a significant problem with ANN is its black-box approach.
PCS depend on being completely determined, or at least nearly so, in operation. An ANN
removes this certainty, especially when dealing with a nontrivial number (>> 100) of input
and output variables. One approach is to not depend on the ANN for overall classification
of the process, but to modularize different control sections, e.g., PID loops, with a small
(<< 10) ANN for each of these. This simplifies the ANN allowing its operation to be
more completely understood due to its reduced dimension. The use of smaller, modular
ANNs, as well as safeguards on classification errors can be mitigated with Rule-Based
Expert Systems (RBES). These are intended to provide the glue logic and other bounds
checking prior to incorporation into an advisory output to the operator. [24] As shown in
Figure 3: Architecture of hierarchical layer 1.
Fig. 3, small ANNs classify the operating state of individual control loops from various sub
processes against known, valid operating states. When an anomaly is detected, this is sent
to the RBES, which determines an advisory message to send to the operator for awareness,
possibly suggesting corrective actions. For changes in equipment due to age, wear, etc. this
can be handled through partial retraining of the ANN periodically, e.g., replacing 20% of
the original training data set with recently collected, non-anomalous process data. Similar
work has been done in the utilization of sensor validation networks, e.g., [25], such as virtual
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sensors and detecting drift in sensor calibration.
3.3 Defining the Community Hierarchical Layer
While the previous section described functionality at the local layer, community-scale so-
lutions need to occur at a hierarchical layer above this, i.e., the community layer, 2. The
community layer coordinates the local layer at various critical infrastructure, e.g., power
generation, distribution, water treatment and delivery, etc., with each other at a centralized
point for community planning. This centralized point can be a city council, mayors office,
or center for catastrophic event response. This architecture is illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5.
In the diagram shown in Fig. 4, the local layer for each individual infrastructure is inter-
Figure 4: Overall architecture of the community layer, hierarchical layer 2.
connected to a community layer through bi-directional links. Characteristic 3b is achieved
by definition, as defined in the architecture at the local layer, and the extension to the com-
munity layer enables characteristic 3a. It is important to note that the individual sites may
coordinate with each other without the community layer to handle some interdependencies
and situational awareness, e.g., the water company can be alerted to cyber-attacks on the
power system that may affect certain water delivery pumps. The activities depicted in Fig.
Figure 5: Activities of hierarchical layer 2.
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5 can be performed with the same ANN and RBES hybrid as employed at the local layer,
Fig. 3. The community layer monitors status variables from each critical infrastructure site
similarly to control loops with ANNs. These become classifications of operating state and
detected anomalies, which are then fed to a RBES. The RBES handles interdependencies
between infrastructure based on expert knowledge and applies policy directives to calculate
responses to anomalous behavior and catastrophic events.
Thus, the classifications provide for a community-scale situational awareness through a vi-
sualization interface, and the rule sets handle mitigating responses as an intelligent advisor,
similar to the advisory output made available to the operator through the HMI at the local
layer. The command interface allows manual input of actions to coordinate critical infras-
tructure or through automation for certain actions as appropriate. This takes all critical
infrastructure sites into consideration to achieve an overall optimal solution versus com-
peting local optimizations, solving the vulnerability conundrum [22] and further satisfying
characteristic 3.
3.4 Data Centric Aspects of the Architecture
The architecture is data-centric through its utilization of process variables (data) at the
local layer for training and classification of operating state. The large numbers of sensory
inputs, typically 100s to 1000s for critical infrastructure processes, ensure a sufficient level of
dimensionality to accurately classify operating state, even in the presence of outliers. These
outliers, which are process variables outside of their normal range for a given operating state,
are used to determine anomalous behavior. The RBES can recall pre-programmed advisory
statements to send to the operator for given outliers. For example, a pumps rotational speed
is much higher than expected for a given flow, therefore the pump may be worn or the flow
sensor may be out of calibration. If examination of other process variables eliminates both
of these cases, a possible conclusion would be an intruder spoofing the process variables
in the PCS. Most critical infrastructure PCS in operation today have years of real time
data, and only operate in a finite state-space, providing a data rich environment for model
training and classification. These aspects are illustrated in Fig. 6.
Figure 6: Data centric aspects of the architecture.
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3.5 Event Driven Aspects of the Architecture
The architecture is also event driven through its actions, advisory or automated, based
on anomalous activity, i.e. anomalous classification of process variables and detection of
outliers. The event-driven advisory feedback to local layer operators drives mitigating
responses at the local level through the operator, i.e., human in the loop. At the community
layer, events at other critical infrastructure sites may influence a given site, and events
created by the community layer managers actions flow downstream to manually guide local
layer sites. At the local layer, classification of anomalous process data triggers the action of
a mitigating response, e.g., advisory output. In the previous example on data centric aspects
section, the events include operator verification of the process and technician validation of
equipment. The actions performed at the local layer become events that trigger subsequent
actions at the community layer. In the previous example this might include: preparing other
infrastructure dependent on this process of potential outages; alerting the community of
disruption of service; or alerting all sites and deploying network countermeasures if a cyber-
attack is determined. These aspects are illustrated in Fig. 7.
Figure 7: Event driven aspects of the architecture.
3.6 Use Cases of the Architecture
In Fig. 8, a general use case diagram is illustrated. The two primary human actors are the
process control system operator at the local critical infrastructure site, and a city council
operator at a community-planning site. Communications between these two may take
place externally, e.g., discussion via telephone, or through the architecture itself. The city
council operator sees all infrastructure within the community and can thus influence the
local layer through the bi-directional coordination links. This coordinating information is
taken into the local model, along with the local process data, to build the advisory outputs
to the operator. The infrastructure operator receives advice from the local layer. This
advice is constructed to provide straightforward and meaningful information on anomalies
detected, pointing to specific process points or equipment, which can be investigated by
local personnel. The advice may also include suggested corrective actions derived from
the RBES with rules set by local engineering personnel. As this advisory/response process
occurs, the status of the infrastructure process is sent upstream to the community layer.
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Figure 8: Use cases of the architecture.
At the community layer, a city council operator keeps community management personnel
informed, which in turn alerts the community as needed. The city council operator can
take mitigating actions. Some sample scenarios follow.
Sample scenario 1: Cyber-attack detected at water treatment plant
• Local layer
– Detect attack through anomalous sensor readings
– Isolate water treatment plant from Internet
– Validate suspect sensors and control logic
– Place in manual control and initiate network cyber-security countermeasures
• Community layer
– Isolate other critical infrastructure networks as precaution
– Check dependencies on other critical infrastructure, i.e., clean water may become
unavailable, plan accordingly
– Determine community impact and affected areas to verify water is safe
Sample scenario 2: Catastrophic failure of power grid, e.g., storm or earthquake
• Local layer
– Detect failure through alarms and sensor data
– Determine scope and attempt to localize faults to protect the grid
– Increase monitoring of remaining power grid sections
• Community layer
– Check dependencies on other critical infrastructure, i.e., water delivery and
telecommunications disruptions from equipment powered by the affected section
of the power grid, re-route water distribution and communications
– Determine community impact, initiate water rationing, limit communications
bandwidth
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4 Conclusions
The architecture for community-scale coordination of critical infrastructure has been de-
signed to provide an intelligent approach to securing the resilience of critical infrastructure
process control systems. Through training and expert knowledge, a process-aware model
is created at the local layer to detect and advise on local process anomalies. By up-linking
these local models, a community-scale approach is realized. All critical infrastructure in a
community can share in detection of anomalous behavior, and their mitigating responses can
be coordinated for the optimal solution for the whole community. Characteristics achieved
are a simplified implementation through automated training on process data, while modu-
larizing this training and applying rule-based logic minimizes the black box approach that
is unfavorable in process control systems. Further enhancing acceptance are failure modes
isolated from the process at the local layer through a read only interface, and the provision
of only advisory outputs with human (operator) in the loop validation.
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